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Introduction
Fiji is the most urbanised state in Melanesia. Its 
main city, Suva, is facing many challenges of rapid 
growth. With more than 50 per cent of its popula-
tion now living in its cities and that number set to 
increase to about 60 per cent in the next decade 
(UN-Habitat 2012a), Suva officials and residents 
are working to address the pressures of urbanisation 
and to capitalise on its opportunities.
Rapid growth has given rise to familiar urban 
problems in Suva, including unemployment, pov-
erty, informal settlements and patchy services — 
about a fifth of the Greater Suva residents live in 
informal or squatter settlements,1 many in poverty 
with poor services and connectivity to the city. Yet 
despite the inequities and service gaps, positive 
gains from urbanisation are being made in Suva. 
The challenge for urban managers and residents is 
to capitilise on the potential of cities to boost pro-
ductivity, connectivity and infrastructure coverage 
while better managing emerging social, cultural 
and service delivery divides. There are some pos-
itive signs. While unemployment in Fiji is high, 
at about 7.6 per cent, it is declining; Suva remains 
a strong driver of national economic growth, 
accounting for about a third of gross domestic 
product (GDP); and while urban poverty persists, 
it is falling (World Bank 2014). Moreover, emerging 
institutional arrangements are attempting to recon-
cile the impetus for growth with customary values 
and land tenure.
As part of a broader study of urbanisation by 
the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 
(SSGM) program at the Australian National Uni-
versity, this paper outlines some of the tensions 
and innovations that have occurred in Suva with 
respect to urban development and informal settle-
ments over the last decade. ‘Informal settlements’ is 
an umbrella term used in this paper to encompass 
settlements of ‘squatters’ (the vernacular term for 
those who reside on freehold or state land without 
legal title), and people who have made informal 
arrangements with owners to reside on customary 
land. Both situations tend to mushroom in rapidly 
urbanising contexts, and Fiji’s attempts to grapple 
with this and other urban issues might be applica-
ble across the Pacific region. The research involved 
reviewing government documents and literature, 
and conducting interviews with high-level govern-
ment officials in the Ministry of Lands, Department 
of Housing, Suva City Council and Nausori Town 
Council, as well as with key community stakehold-
ers. We consider the lessons that can be learnt from 
Suva’s experiences and the challenges that lie ahead. 
In particular, we are concerned with addressing 
issues of exclusion, inequality, and access to urban 
land and shelter.
Cities as Drivers of Development:  
Competing Priorities
Globally, interventions to address urban poverty 
are strongly underpinned by neoliberal ideology 
which holds economic growth as the central priority 
and considers the free market and property rights 
as the most effective means to achieving urban 
development. When neoliberal approaches address 
poverty and social marginalisation, they often do 
so through ‘supplements’ or incentives that are pro-
development and market-friendly (Schilcher 2007). 
In many cases, mechanisms to tackle rising poverty 
and social marginalisation involve a further ‘roll-
out’ of neoliberal approaches, as exemplified by 
Bogaert (2011) in his case study of Morocco. Faced 
with urban social unrest and rising 
urban inequalities, ‘slum upgrad-
ing’ programs worked closely with 
the private sector, supported by 
international agencies, to integrate 
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slum dwellers into the formal (economic and prop-
erty) market, and increase access to finances and 
low-income housing. While this approach meets 
the needs of some, the framing of urban poverty 
in developing countries as largely a technical prob-
lem to be solved by market-oriented approaches 
neglects political hegemony and deeper social or 
cultural divides (Bogaert 2011; Rigon 2014).
In Fiji, and Melanesian cities in general, neolib-
eral approaches to urban development must jostle 
for authority with customary values of mutual obli-
gation and reciprocity, and customary land tenure 
arrangements. Colonial history also has unresolved 
land tenure and equity issues, leading to calls from 
religious, political, ethno-nationalist and non-gov-
ernment organisation (NGO) parties to improve 
equity, address historical wrongs and alleviate eth-
nic disadvantage (Sakai 2016). Further complica-
tions to the implementation of neoliberal ideolo-
gies are encountered in much of Oceania because 
of customary landownership, particularly in the 
rapidly growing peri-urban areas. This land is not 
directly controlled by government, nor do neo-
liberal frames have particularly strong resonance 
with many traditional owners. This aligns with the 
‘moral confusions’ found in many Pacific states, 
as they seek to reconcile good governance with 
‘continuing loyalties, indigenous modes of produc-
tion … complex and long histories, and the quest 
for better access to, if not a larger share in, global 
wealth’ (Bryant-Tokalau 2012). These ‘confusions’ 
are compounded by those that ‘capitalise on culture’ 
for personal gain (Rutz 1987; Ward 1995).
Various authors (Jessop 2002; Peck and Tickell 
2002; Thibault 2007) have argued that in urban 
contexts where state reach is limited and social 
exclusion rising better connectivity between neo- 
liberal and neo-communitarian approaches could 
boost inclusiveness and harness under-used 
and undervalued community resources. Neo-
communitarianism has particular resonance in 
the Melanesian context, with its emphasis on the 
contribution of the ‘social economy’, customary 
values and the links between economic and 
community development (Jessop 2002). In practice, 
this involves greater support to, and involvement 
of, multi-sector partnerships and networks by 
moving beyond private–public partnerships to 
engage alliances among communities, NGOs, 
religious groups and social networks in order to 
fill national service gaps. This leverages human 
skills and financial resources in community and 
harnesses social and economic resources in the 
informal sector for the co-production of goods 
and services of value — culturally and materially 
— to residents (Albrechts 2013; Ostrom 1996). 
In Melanesian cities, where urban sprawl affects 
customary land, and a good portion of economic 
activity is informal, linkages between the formal 
and informal, and between social sectors, seems 
inevitable and, arguably, favourable.
Dealing with urban poverty is about creat-
ing opportunities wherever they occur — building 
social and physical assets, managing risk, increasing 
access to credit, strengthening community empow-
erment and political governance, and reducing 
inequality (World Bank 2001b). Achieving these 
lofty goals will require engagement that spans all 
living spaces and socioeconomic realms of the city. 
Importantly, it will mean putting ‘community’ back 
into ‘community development’ — that is, using 
community development and human resources to 
deliver socially valued goods, in addition to eco-
nomic development (Thibault 2007).
The Changing Urban Politics of Fiji
In the past, Fiji’s attitude towards the societal prob-
lems of urbanisation has been rightly criticised, 
particularly for its denial of poverty (Khan and Barr 
2003) and harsh policies that skirt underlying caus-
es of urban poverty and crime. Those in the infor-
mal sector have historically been forcibly removed, 
with the eviction of squatters or unlicensed vendors 
such as juice sellers and ‘shoe-shine boys’ (Connell 
2003; Connell and Lea 2002). In 2006, the minis-
ter for Housing, Adi Caucau, uncompromisingly 
advised that:
‘the more than 10 percent of the country’s 
population who are forced to survive as 
squatters are like thieves because they live 
illegally on someone else’s land … and police 
should make every effort to round them up 
and remove them’ (Bryant-Tokalau 2010, 
quoting Cacau 2006).
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But such hardline attitudes fail to deal with the 
underlying drivers of urban problems; they disre-
gard the significance of customary land tenure and 
values, lack of livelihoods, limited financial acces-
sibility, and growing inequality, all of which com-
bine, on occasions, to fuel social tensions (cf. Sim-
mons 13/7/2016; Moceituba 20/7/2015). Perverse 
economic incentives, such as extremely high land 
costs and taxes, and inefficient land administration 
systems — erratically enforced — make squatting 
the rational response to land shortages, inequitable 
land allocation systems, and rising inequity (Chand 
and Yala 2008; Keen and McNeil 2016). These can 
be exasperated by ethnic divides, social instability 
and unemployment resulting from policy frame-
works that fail to create linkages between formal 
and informal sectors. Outside of the Pacific, studies 
have found that viewing the informal and formal 
sectors as independent, separate and even antago-
nistic to each other leads to missed opportunities 
for development with respect to economic growth, 
service delivery and inclusion (Jessop 2002; Rao 
1996). If cultural tensions and perverse incentives 
are neglected, programs targeting resettlement or 
‘slum upgrades’ might shift urban problems around 
the city, or create pockets of relief, but will not nec-
essarily stem discontent.
Yet, over the last decade there has been a 
discernible shift in urban policy in Fiji, both in 
rhetoric and practice, which is evident in our own 
research and corroborated by others’ experiences 
(cf. Bryant-Tokalau 2010, 2014; World Bank 2015). 
The shift has been partially in response to external 
pressures and partially a shift in local attitudes. For 
example, the UN Declaration of Human Rights rec-
ognises the basic human right of access to housing 
and necessary basic services (Article 25), and this 
is reinforced by the United Nations Human Settle-
ments Programme (UN-Habitat) which produces 
urban profiles of cities highlighting the extent of 
urban shelter and service shortfalls and the need for 
‘slum’ or informal settlement upgrade programs (cf. 
UN-Habitat 2003, 2012a). Further external pressure 
to put urban issues higher on the policy agenda 
comes from the UN-Habitat push for a ‘New Urban 
Agenda’ to address entrenched informality and pol-
itics of exclusion. 
Global and local initiatives to benchmark and 
improve life in informal settlements — to which 
the above programs contribute — can help to focus 
political and policy attention. Urban policy and 
NGO/government activities were spawned around 
the globe in response to the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals: like Target 7c to ‘halve, by 2015, the 
proportion of the population without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation’, 
and 7d to ‘achieve, by 2020, a significant improve-
ment in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwell-
ers’. The most recent UN Sustainable Development 
Goals sharpen the focus on sustainable cities fur-
ther; for example, Goal 11 which aims to ‘make cit-
ies and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient 
and sustainable’. Benchmarking and international 
frameworks may not determine national policy, or 
even produce outcomes in all contexts, but they can 
provide a valuable policy nudge.
Fiji’s shift in attitude to the city has been recog-
nised by the World Bank — in contrast to that of 
other Pacific islands countries. The World Bank 
notes that the Fijian national government has ‘a 
progressive policy perspective to dealing with the 
challenges of urbanisation, and sees settlers as 
important contributors to society’ (2015:xi). This 
attitudinal shift has been reflected in the National 
Housing Policy of 2011 and the 2013 constitution 
amendment (section 39.1); the latter enshrines each 
Fijian’s right to freedom from arbitrary eviction: 
Every person has the right to freedom from 
arbitrary evictions from his or her home or to 
have his or her home demolished, without an 
order of a court made after considering all the 
relevant circumstances.
A senior government official observes that he has 
witnessed a shift away from evictions throughout 
his career working on urban issues:
It previously used to happen that we would 
take informal settlers to court. Now the gov-
ernment doesn’t want to evict people force-
fully. Because they also want to comply with 
the UN charter for human rights. So now the 
government tries to look for space then asks 
the squatters to relocate.2 
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During the last election in 2014, the 
need to constructively deal with housing 
for informal settlers was a central election 
issue (Tuwere 6/8/2014), suggesting citizen 
as well as official concern. The Bainimara-
ma government placed urban development 
higher on the policy agenda than ever, 
likely driven by a desire to appeal to the 
growing numbers of urban voters, particu-
larly in the Nausori–Suva–Lami corridor, 
and to harness the development potential of 
the cities given the stagnation of the agricul-
tural sector (Lal 2014; MacWilliam 2015). 
Suva: The Changing Face of the City 
Between 2002 and 2010, Suva’s urban population 
increased by 5 per cent to a total of 51 per cent 
of the Fijian population. The Greater Suva Urban 
Area (GSUA) comprises Suva City (the capital) and 
three municipal towns: Lami, Nasinu and Nausori. 
Suva and Nasinu comprise around 57 per cent of 
the urban population, with an estimated 244,000 
people living in the Suva–Nausori corridor (UN-
Habitat 2012a). According to the same report, aver-
age population growth hovers at around 1.7 per 
cent, and approximately 30 per cent of the national 
GDP is generated in the GSUA — making it the 
country’s economic centre.
The population of Fiji is comprised predomi-
nantly of Indigenous Fijians (57 per cent), com-
monly referred to as iTaukei, and Indo-Fijians (38 
per cent) who are mostly descended from migrants 
forced into indentured labour by British colonisers 
(FIBOS 2007). Until the 1960s, indigenous migra-
tion to urban areas was tightly restricted by colo-
nial administrators across the Pacific (Chung and 
Hill 2002), virtually confining iTaukei to the villages 
as a way of ‘preserving’ indigenous culture and con-
trolling urban development. Since these restrictions 
were lifted, there has been significant rural-to-urban 
migration amongst both iTaukei and Indo-Fijian 
demographics.
The urban drift is caused by a number of socio-
historical and politico-economic patterns. The 
expiry and non-renewal of thousands of sugar-
cane leases in the Western and Northern divisions 
between 1997 and 2014 pushed (and continues 
to push) many farming families and unemployed 
farmhands to urban areas (Naidu and Matadradra 
2014), and fuels much of the current debate over 
Fijian land (Bryant-Tokalau 2012). Between 1997 
and 2007, the number of Indo-Fijian farming fami-
lies fell by about 25 per cent (Market Development 
Facility 2013). 
While poverty has dramatically decreased by 
34 per cent in urban areas since 2002, incidences 
of poverty in rural areas have increased by 6 per 
cent during the same period (FIBOS 2011). This 
may be linked to expiring land leases, as well as 
to the decline in the sugar industry, both factors 
pushing people out of rural areas in search of bet-
ter opportunities in the cities. The perception of 
better employment prospects and improved edu-
cational opportunities for children have pulled 
many families towards Suva and surrounding areas, 
as illustrated in Table 1. Thus in just 20 years, Fiji 
transformed from a predominantly rural to a pre-
dominantly urban society — similar trends or rapid 
urbanisation can be seen throughout Oceania. 
In the GSUA, a lack of urban infrastructure has 
made it difficult for authorities to accommodate 
the needs of the rapidly expanding urban popula-
tion. With the urban centre nearly at capacity, the 
growth is mostly concentrated in the outer informal 
settlements. Due to the housing shortage, many 
families have resorted to settling on marginal lands 
without a formal lease leading to Nasinu being 
dubbed the ‘squatter town’ (Fiji Ministry of Local 
Government, Urban Development, Housing and 
Environment 2011). Figures from the Ministry of 
National Planning (2009) suggest that squatters 
constitute approximately 7 per cent of the Fijian 
Source: Adapted from UN-Habitat 2012a:10 based on Department of 
Town and Country Planning data.
Table 1: Projected population growth in the Greater Suva
Municipal Council 2011 2016 2021
Suva City 75,980 77,900 79,470
Lami Town 11,060 11,450 11,860
Nasinu Town 82,980 90,720 98,210
Nausori Town 26,970 29,200 31,610
Total GSUA 196,990 209,270 221,150
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population as a whole and 15 per cent of the urban 
population. However, accurate data on squatters and 
informal settlers generally is notoriously difficult 
to access: social commentator and advocate for the 
poor Father Kevin Barr argues that socioeconomic 
surveys inadequately capture this demographic and 
that the nationwide figure is more like 20 per cent.3
As in many cities, informal settlements in Suva 
vary in size; they range from two or three house-
holds on the side of a road to Jittu Estate in Suva, 
in which 850 households were counted in the last 
socioeconomic survey. Most informal settlements 
are on marginal lands, including flood-prone areas, 
unstable hillsides, stream banks, and areas adjacent 
to rubbish dumps or industrial areas (Gravelle and 
Mimura 2008; World Bank 2001a). The recent dev-
astation of Cyclone Winston was a harsh reminder 
of Suva’s vulnerability to natural hazards, particu-
larly in the informal settlements. Although these 
residents face insecure land tenure, overcrowding, 
poor housing and patchy access to services, the 
situation is improving and is more manageable than 
elsewhere in the Pacific, as explained further in sec-
tions below (cf. World Bank 2015).
In Fiji, little is more important than land — it 
forms part of Fijian identity and to some extent 
guarantees indigenous privilege (Ward 1995). 
Urban sprawl encroaches upon all three types of 
land that exist in the GSUA: state land, which is 
managed by the Department of Lands and Survey; 
iTaukei lands, which are managed by the iTaukei 
Lands Trust Board (TLTB); and privately held land 
(UN-Habitat 2012a). The vast majority of land 
across Fiji is customary, approximately 88 per cent. 
The land in the GSUA is also mostly iTaukei land, 
though Crown and freehold land occurs in chunks 
Source: iTaukei Land Trust Board. 
Note: This map was last updated in 1986. There have been minimal changes in the percentage of land tenures since then. However, 
much of the unused ‘State Schedule A and B’ land—held by the state in trust for indigenous landowners—is in the process of being 
reverted to customary land through the TLTB. 
 
Figure 1: Land Tenure in Greater Suva Urban Area (GSUA).
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throughout the city, initially alienated by British 
colonisers, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
While maps like the above neatly delineate 
landownership, disputes persist. The majority of 
growth is occurring on iTaukei land for which 
planning regulations are weak and dependent on 
cooperation with traditional landowners. Part of 
Suva’s success in urban management has been the 
densification of urban development on alienated 
land, and the use of the TLTB to facilitate urban 
development by the private sector on customary 
land through long-term leases. But as outlined 
below, both have not escaped tensions and difficul-
ties, so systems of urban management continue to 
evolve and officials look for ways to better support 
development on both alienated and customary land 
in urban and peri-urban areas. Solutions tend to 
be hybrid institutions (at least in theory). These 
hybrids aim to blend neoliberal and customary sys-
tems of governance. In practice, the driving motiva-
tion leans strongly to neoliberal goals of commer-
cialising land and drawing customary landowners 
into the market economy. 
Planning for Growth: Layering Governance
Across Melanesia the rapid rate of urban growth 
almost defies proactive and strategic planning. 
Inevitably, informal settlements grow faster than 
the plans for serviced settlements, resulting in 
areas being not only poorly serviced but unhealthy 
and frequently vulnerable to natural hazards and 
disease because of poor drainage, housing, road 
access and services. Because many informal settle-
ments do not officially exist, they become part of a 
policy and service vacuum with residents having no 
rights to the land, services or representation. A gulf 
between formal and informal systems emerges and 
is re-enforced by the dominant political economy, 
creating social segregation and disadvantage. 
Marginalisation or neglect, however, does not 
make informal settlements disappear; their per-
manent nature is well accepted now, as is the need 
to more strategically manage the mushrooming 
problem of informal settlements and service short-
falls (Lucci et al. 2015). Because government reach 
is limited across Melanesian cities, much urban 
assistance is externally driven by donors, religious 
groups and NGOs, often functioning in collabora-
tion with communities. Given the limited capac-
ity of the state, urban institutional safety nets are 
not systemic, but rather dependent on ‘self-care’ 
(Lemke 2001 as cited in Bogaert 2011), or external 
agents/donors.
The governance of urban growth in Suva is 
undertaken within a framework of town planning 
schemes and by-laws (UN-Habitat 2012b), and is 
predominantly focused on alienated land and the 
formal sector. The Town and Country Planning 
Department, which sits within the Ministry of 
Local Government, Housing, Environment, Infra-
structure & Transport, regulates land-use patterns 
and has zoning under its jurisdiction. The munici-
pal councils of Suva, Lami, Nasinu and Nausori 
towns each use approved town planning schemes 
as their key planning instrument. Lessees need to 
seek approval for development from their munici-
pal council, who then gain approval from Town 
and Country Planning, creating multiple layers of 
governance. 
Competition and gaps between national and 
local planning agencies also still persist. Each 
municipal chief executive officer (CEO) over-
sees everyday operations of the local councils, but 
the local agencies are also overseen by a ‘Special 
Administrator’ appointed by the central govern-
ment, who is particularly focused on improving 
rate collection, and thus economic viability of local 
governments. Suva City Council is self-funding, no 
longer reliant on central government transfers now 
that rates and revenue collection is much improved; 
this is far from the case for other Melanesian cit-
ies like Honiara in Solomon Islands. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the councils are not fully independent 
from national government agencies causes signifi-
cant delays in approval processes and jurisdictional 
tensions. For example, it is claimed that the over-
lap between the CEO and the Special Administra-
tor leads to confusion and a high turnover of staff 
(UN-Habitat 2012a). It also has the potential to 
reduce responsiveness to local values and priorities.
Customary Land: Shared Responsibility
Local councils have much less direct governance 
powers over customary land, which falls to spe-
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cialised national agencies. The iTaukei Land Trust 
Board sits within the Fiji Department of iTaukei 
Affairs, and is mandated to protect and negotiate 
customary landowner rights and manage commer-
cial transactions over the use of these lands. When 
customary urban land is developed, the power is 
given to the mataqali (see Box 1). Some historians 
claim that the control of the mataqali over cus-
tomary land management was a colonial ‘invented 
tradition’ that enabled easier access to inalienable, 
customary land, but did not necessarily reflect cus-
tomary landowners traditions and values (cf. Rutz 
1987). While benefit-sharing continues to vary, 
outcomes favouring customary landowners and 
priorities may be compromised if mataqali act in 
their own self-interest or do not have the skill-set 
required to maximise community benefits.  
The TLTB’s contemporary focus is on facilitat-
ing private investment through leases and licences 
for tenants and managing the proceeds for the 
mataqali beneficiaries. As iTaukei land cannot be 
sold, the land can only be accessed through leasing. 
The core tension in iTaukei customary land law is 
the conflict between inalienability of land and the 
need for economic certainty to underpin invest-
ment (Dodd 2012).
The issue of equitable benefit-sharing when 
customary land is developed remains a sensitive 
one. The TLTB officially recoups no more than 
10 per cent for administrative costs and the rest 
flows to the landowning community, though there 
are allegations of problems with accountability, 
distribution and rent transparency. In 2010, the 
Bainimarama government amended the Leases and 
Licenses Regulations of the Native Land Act to pay 
TLTB lease income directly to the individual bank 
account of iTaukei landowners. This decision was 
aimed at addressing allegations of corruption and 
inequitable rent distribution within communities. 
Still, ethno-nationalists argue that the ‘capitalist’ 
notion of individual payments undercuts iTaukei 
communities and values like solesolevaki (work-
ing together) and veirogorogoci (Sakai 2016). They 
also allege that income earned from communally 
owned land will not necessarily end up supporting 
the maintenance or development of the commu-
nity, or funding community obligations like funer-
Box 1: Vanua and Customary Landowner 
Rights
Customary landownership is inextricably 
linked to the iTaukei concept of vanua, which 
literally means land but is a holistic term that 
also incorporates community, environment 
and spirit. Each vanua is made up of several 
yavusa (tribes) which are in turn constituted 
by the mataqali (clans). Each mataqali has a 
chiefly system within which people inherit 
their social roles, which come with commu-
nal obligations and reciprocity; values that are 
inherent in iTaukei culture. Although each 
mataqali is represented in the vanua, chiefly 
rivalry remains strong, particularly at the local 
level (Norton 2007). As chiefs inherit their 
titles, accountability and equity are variable 
from community to community, and are often 
criticised because of the high rates of abuse 
(Delaibatiki 17/3/2015).
The concept of a native land trust was 
established by the colonial government which 
recognised mataqali (clan) landownership 
and glossed over the multilayered and com-
plex forms of ownership predating colonialism 
(Sakai 2015). Chiefly landownership was once 
fluid and contestable, but European adminis-
tration grafted particular mataqali to particu-
lar lands. There is also a long-standing gender 
bias to Fijian leadership: women, while typi-
cally well-represented in informal community 
politics, have historically benefited less than 
their male counterparts in the chiefly system 
and remain under-represented in contem-
porary national politics (Spark and Corbett 
2016). 
So, there remains contestation over the 
ongoing legitimacy and authority of the chiefly 
system in the current political climate, as well 
as who should rightfully represent customary 
community interests. While it has lost some 
authority at a federal level, the traditions of 
family obligation, reciprocity and hierarchy 
remain socially and locally powerful, all of 
which complicates contemporary urban issues 
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als (admittedly an expensive affair) or recovery 
from natural disasters. However, there was never 
any legal obligations for chiefs to redistribute 
lease monies, or spend them on traditional obli-
gations to begin with (ibid.). While this is true 
with respect to ‘black letter law’, arguably there 
remains a social expectation on chiefs to help 
meet the needs of their people.
The hybrid TLTB system aimed at creating 
a linkage between neoliberal and neo-commu-
nitarian urban systems often falls short of meet-
ing legal and customary expectations, and of 
controlling rent-seeking. Outcomes and impli-
cations of the system can differ between land-
owning units, influenced by divergent traditional 
leadership structures, shifts in power within the 
community, and community expectations. Even 
so, state control over leasing regimes is likely 
to tighten to achieve dominant economic/for-
mal sector objectives; this will increase financial 
accountability but decrease control for landown-
ers (Dodd 2012). Once landowners lease their 
land to the TLTB the terms of the investor’s lease 
is largely out of their hands, including, in some 
cases, the returns to the community. The lack of 
control of land management and land rents once 
customary landowners lease the land through 
the TLTB remains a sensitive issue (Rawalia 
30/7/2015; Sakai 2016).
Another, more recent, pro-development ini-
tiative encouraged by the National Housing Pol-
icy of 2011 has been to establish the Land Bank 
(Box 2). Benefit-sharing arrangements under the 
Land Bank are far from assured and interest has 
been low. The Lands Department is concerned 
that too few owners are aware of the benefits of 
land development, and sees one of its princi-
pal ongoing objectives as increasing awareness 
amongst iTaukei landowners of the development 
options open to them.4 The reluctance of land-
owners to engage with the Land Bank model 
was predicted when the Land Bank was first 
established (Prasad 2012). It is not clear whether 
the problem really is a lack of understanding of 
long-term economic benefits; or a higher prior-
itisation of communitarian values. The Land Use 
Decree restricts the jurisdiction of the courts 
Box 2: Establishment of the Land Bank 
The Land Bank — administered by a Land Use Unit 
within the Department of Lands — was established 
by the 2010 Land Use Decree for the purpose of gen-
erating economic activity through proper land use. 
The decree controversially reduces the powers of the 
Land Bank’s competitor, the TLTB (McDonnell 2015).
Native landowners or mataqali (see Box 1) 
lease their land to the government through the 
Land Bank, after which the land will be subleased 
to investors (mostly foreign) or farmers for a peri-
od of no more than 99 years. If the proposed devel-
opment is on the portion of iTaukei land catego-
rised as ‘reserved’, it requires consent from over 60 
per cent of the mataqali. The Land Bank does a fea-
sibility survey of the registered land, puts it on the 
market for tender and works with Investment Fiji 
to secure investors for the development of the land. 
The Land Bank brokers the development deals 
between the landowners (represented by the TLTB) 
and the private investor. While landowners can 
state their preference for the land’s use, they have 
little control over who the land is subleased to once 
it has been registered. For example, if a construc-
tion firm undertakes the development on a block of 
apartments, premiums and rental are determined at 
market rates after land valuation by the Ministry of 
Lands, and a royalty is then paid to the landowner. 
Unlike the TLTB, the Land Bank is not bound 
by customary obligations, allowing for quicker pro-
cesses to finalise leases. Although customary land 
title holders retain ownership of the land, they do 
not retain authority over it. The establishment of 
the Land Bank was an effort to encourage develop-
ment on iTaukei land, particularly in rural areas, 
which has underutilised development potential or 
which is lying fallow. But it has also been applied 
in the city; for example, in Wailekutu in Lami. By 
2014, 64 landowning groups in both rural and 
urban settings who deposited their land leases with 
the Land Bank had successfully rented out to inves-
tors, bringing in around AU$470million worth of 
business to Fiji (Chand 7/7/2014) — generating 
much needed income but sacrificing customary 
control.
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and therefore limits the ability of landowners to 
seek protection and redress. Moreover, while the 
decree states that leases will be issued in the ‘best 
interests’ of landowners, this is balanced ‘against 
the wellbeing of the economy’ and there have been 
some controversies over the extent to which land-
owners rights are protected, and whether they are 
receiving their ‘fair share’ of revenues from develop-
ment leases on their lands (McDonnell 2015).
Frustration with the inadequacies of formal 
institutions has led to a rise in vakavanua arrange-
ments, which enable informal access to native 
land granted directly by customary landowners in 
response to traditional requests or in exchange for 
offerings (Kiddle 2009; Ward 1995). Landowners 
pursue these arrangements because the economic 
returns are higher than through the TLTB arrange-
ment, and because they are able to maintain greater 
control over the use of, and the terms of access to, 
the land. While the informal arrangements are less 
secure for those leasing the land, the shortage of 
urban land and high costs of access assures that 
there are plenty willing to accept these informal 
arrangements. 
At the moment when iTaukei landowners lease 
their land to developers or settlers directly through 
unofficial means, significant problems can arise 
for tenants who may have unregulated payment 
schemes levied on them, be evicted, have poor or 
no access to basic services, and be forced to live in 
substandard housing (Naidu and Matadradra 2014). 
Landowners are also vulnerable to unscrupulous 
investors and may not get contractually enforce-
able fair rents. Vakavanua arrangements are likely 
to persist despite insecure tenure and little (if any) 
legal recognition, so it may pay to consider how 
these arrangements can be recognised and made 
more secure without eroding the advantages they 
provide to the community.
While Fijians have not resolved the vexed issues 
around urban land development on both alienated 
and customary land, they are experimenting with 
models and options to better enable landowners to 
develop their land, facilitate interactions between 
investors and title holders, increase revenues, and 
maintain customary control over land and its 
diverse social, as well as economic, values. The suc-
cess of the solutions being implemented for both 
national and communal development is dependent 
not only on legal frames, bureaucratic competency 
and economic efficiency, but also on the sociocul-
tural values and frames that shape behaviour. To 
a large extent, the models in place aim to facilitate 
economic growth and investment and improve 
accountability, but are less strong on protecting cus-
tomary and community values and benefit-sharing. 
The latter, if neglected, has the potential to fuel 
social resistance to private investment and to urban 
newcomers.
‘Regularising’ Land Tenure:  
Linking Formal and Informal Systems?
Suva was one of the first Pacific islands countries 
to recognise the rights of informal settlers and 
extend services to them — in essence creating a 
policy bridge between the informal and formal 
sector. One reform it has established is to regu-
larise land tenure, which means granting squatters a 
title to the land at low cost, allowing them to enter 
the formal housing sector. The rationale behind 
regularisation on state land — though sometimes 
expressed in pro-poor rhetoric — is largely about 
neoliberal economics: it is considered better to 
have a property market, in which authorities can 
be aware of land-use and ownership, collect rates 
from known owners, and provide basic services to 
improve public health and security, than to ignore 
informal settlements or risk the political fallout 
from mass evictions.
A rigorous study of the costs and benefits of 
regularisation has not been done, but even though 
less revenue may be earned directly on individual 
lots by lowering land tenure fees, the lower costs 
may well provide greater overall revenue through 
compliance and rate payments — this is an area 
where more data would be valuable for decision-
makers. Holding the costs of legally obtaining leases 
at extremely high rates can result in low legal com-
pliance and foregone revenues from squatters. For 
example, in Honiara, fixed-term estate leases were 
allocated to flood victims but very few were pur-
chased when the costs of leases were high, resulting 
in informal settlement of the allocated site (Keen 
and McNeil 2016). 
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Land regularisation in Fiji happens through a 
government leasing system under the Crown Lands 
Act. The Department of Housing has a memo-
randum of understanding with the Ministry of 
Lands and is thus given the lease at no cost. The 
Department of Housing then engages consultants 
to prepare subdivision scheme plans and eligible 
‘sitting’ tenants are issued with approval notices, 
after which they are required to start paying rates 
to the municipal council. Engineering then begins 
for the subdivision, with contractors employed to 
undertake civil construction works and the rel-
evant authorities engaged to organise services 
such as roads, electricity and water. Although ser-
vices are technically required to meet the relevant 
authority’s standards, in an effort to make the lease 
more affordable for squatters, some of the build-
ing requirements are waived in this context. For 
example, instead of 10 metre easements for roads, 
6 metres will be permitted and instead of a 2 metre 
yard clearance between houses, 1 metre may be 
permitted.5 There are obvious benefits in these 
shortcuts, because they enable greater affordability 
and density of housing. However, a reasonable con-
cern is that substandard housing may disadvantage 
tenants and create long-term vulnerabilities.
Once the civil works are completed, the govern-
ment subsidises 50 per cent of the land premium 
and the sitting tenants in the settlement collec-
tively pay the remaining 50 per cent, equally shared 
amongst the community. Residents are given a six-
month grace period to save and pay for the premi-
um, and the Department of Housing also provides 
a support letter for each resident to the Fiji Nation-
al Provident Fund (NPF), the superannuation fund, 
so they can be eligible for housing assistance to 
help them pay for these costs. 
Those without regular income, particularly 
those engaged in the informal sector, are still likely 
to be disadvantaged in accessing finances and 
securing land/housing; they may ultimately be 
forced to move if they cannot raise funds by the 
end of the grace period. And, it is not just lease 
financing that is needed. Following upgrading, 
each resident must also pay land registration and 
stamp duty. For example, in the case of Bangladesh 
squatter settlement in Nasinu, purchasing the 
title and stamp duty cost residents a total of 
approximately FJ$2500 or AU$1600. Thereafter, 
each resident continues to pay ground rental to the 
Ministry of Lands (or the TLTB, if the settlement 
is on iTaukei land), which equals approximately 
FJ$200 (AU$128) per annum, depending on the 
premium, and is reassessed on a five yearly basis. 
Annual rates continue to be paid by each resident 
to the relevant municipal council. According to 
the Fijian Islands Bureau of Statistics the median 
household income in urban areas in Suva was 
FJ$17,037 when last calculated in 2009 (about 
AU$10,800) (FIBOS 2011).
Due to the heavy government subsidisation 
involved and the need for full servicing, land 
regularisation is costly and can face delays. In the 
words of one senior government official, ‘one of the 
key challenges is the non-availability of serviced 
housing lots. Our construction of those are slow’.6 
Further funds are being sought from international 
aid organisations, like the World Bank, to finance 
this subsidisation program, but that can come with 
its own conditions and constraints. In addition, 
property speculation is recognised as an ongoing 
problem. As a result, there is a restriction in the 
lease conditions which dictates that residents are 
unable to sell their title for 10 years. If they do 
so, they will be required to pay back the whole 
of the development costs. However, translating 
policy from paper to practice can be fraught and 
enforcement is difficult, so there remains the 
potential for sales to continue to happen informally.
The dominant approach followed to date 
assumes that investment will only occur when 
land rights are secured through formalised legal 
frameworks, but there is evidence that this hardline 
dichotomy between legal (good) and illegal (bad) 
is not shared by all in the city. In his study of Fiji 
settlements, Kiddle (2010) found it was far more 
informative to focus on a perceived security-of-
tenure framework which took into account actual 
settlement perception and behaviours. ‘Good 
enough security’ may allow for housing upgrades 
and a feeling of community security and belonging 
in the city, and the way to achieve this is to put in 
place institutional arrangements which remove the 
fear of eviction (see Box 3). 
ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au                                                                                                 11 
SSGM Discussion Paper 2016/6
PROOF 1
There are also initiatives that 
attempt to assist squatters to regular-
ise their claims to customary land, 
such as The Town-Wide Resettle-
ment Program. This is a native land 
leasing system in which the housing 
department consults with the TLTB 
and the concerned landowner. Under 
the leasing agreement on Crown and 
private land, the developer is usually 
required to pay 100 per cent of the 
land premium before the TLTB will 
issue a lease, but in informal settle-
ments on customary land, the pre-
mium may be negotiated at a signifi-
cantly reduced price — often by 50 
per cent per acre. Those settlers with 
allocated lots will collectively share 
the cost of the premium for that 
piece of land. While this program has 
been implemented in Nadonumai 
in Lami town, and Waka Ni Sila in 
Nasinu, this formalisation process is 
lengthy and involved. The attractive-
ness to customary landowners is not 
strong, rents and control are higher 
under informal (vakavanua) arrange-
ments (Kiddle 2010).
An Alternative to Urban Living? 
Rural Resettlement
A second program to manage urban 
growth in the GSUA is a rural reset-
tlement program, which ultimately 
tries to move urban migrants back to 
rural areas. The program was devel-
oped by the Department of Housing, 
Ministry of Agriculture and TLTB 
in collaboration with an NGO, and 
is heavily funded by NZAid. Its first 
iteration involved relocating fami-
lies who were squatting in the Suva 
Jittu Estate squatter settlement to 
rural areas. So far, squatter fami-
lies have settled on 30 acres of land 
in Lomaivuna in the interior and 
200 acres in Vanuakula, Naitisiri. 
Box 3: Regularising land tenure:  
‘Bangladesh’ squatter settlement case study
Mr Didar (pseudonym) moved his wife and three children 
into a semi-permanent house on Crown land in the Bangla-
desh squatter settlement in Nasinu in 1990. He purchased the 
house from his brother for FJ$2800 (about AU$1800), and he 
had been working night shifts in a chicken factory in order to 
finance it. With a leaking roof, pit toilet and holes in the floor, 
Mr Didar says the house ‘was not safety [sic] for the children’, 
and they were scared of eviction.
In 1992, Mr Didar formed a volunteer committee, which 
advocated for land tenure security and services for the settle-
ment. They held meetings directly with the Ministry of Lands 
and frequently lodged complaints about blocked drains with 
Nasinu and Nausori town councils. The Bangladesh land was 
eventually surveyed in the mid-1990s and lots were allocated 
to families. Because the squatter houses had been built in an ad 
hoc way and sandwiched together, there were some houses that 
overlapped on each other’s lots, and certain people were made 
to demolish their houses and relocate to other lots within the 
community, or relocate to another settlement close by. After 
struggling to provide all of the documentation to prove their 
eligibility, temporary ‘approval notices’ were granted for most 
of the Bangladesh squatters in 1999. Mr Didar felt ‘50–70 per cent 
security’ after receiving the approval notice, and built a perma-
nent concrete section at the front of his house in 2000 (which 
now houses 12 members of his extended family).
Disputes over lot ownership, as well as the need to pro-
vide fully approved sewerage, water, electricity, telephone, 
sealed roads and fire hydrants before the titles were formalised, 
caused delays. However, 19 of the squatters were eventually 
granted a 99-year lease on 14 December 2010, with a further 
38 having their lots reserved until they could pay. Mr Didar’s 
lease cost FJ$2085 (AU$1340) and stamp duty totalled FJ$440 
(AU$283). The announcement just before Christmas in 2010 
was met with great celebration amongst the residents, some of 
whom had been there for 35 years (Swami 17/12/2010). As Mr 
Didar said,
When we received the title we were so happy, so happy. 
At least it was something for our kids’ future. You die? 
Never mind, no problem, at least your kids have got 
something there. They’re going to strive for their daily 
needs, daily bread, to put something on the table, but 
they will be happy to have the shelter.
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The families have been trained in farming skills, 
and provided with agricultural tools — the cost of 
which they repay from the revenue from farming 
their newly acquired land.
This can, however, be a slow process that strug-
gles to meet demand: when a notice about the 
resettlement program was posted in Jittu Estate ask-
ing for expressions of interest, it had to promptly be 
removed because it was filled so quickly.7 Further, 
success is difficult to measure and the program can 
be costly. Of the 16 families who initially took part 
in the relocation, 11 of them left for various rea-
sons. Since the initial phase, a total 40 families have 
now been relocated but it is too early to say how 
many will remain (Tokona 8/9/2015).
In some ways this policy is reminiscent of 
past (value-laden) Pacific policies, in which it was 
believed that people would lead more fulfilling lives 
if they returned to rural areas (Connell 2003; Khan 
and Barr 2003). The high demand from squat-
ters themselves for this rural resettlement program 
suggests that many of them also hold these views, 
but, equally, the large number of leavers from the 
first phase suggests expectation of rural life may 
be misconceived, especially if social networks are 
not strong. Costs may well be high for long-term 
outcomes, and there is no guarantee the children 
of those who choose to stay in rural areas will not 
migrate to the city. 
The Mediated Urban Response
A third initiative designed to manage informal set-
tlements is to hold negotiations with settlers, rel-
evant private or customary landowners, the TLTB 
and other relevant government agencies in order 
to come up with a mutually beneficial and socially 
negotiated relocation scheme. One example of this 
exercise is in Nanuku, Vatuwaqa, where there is 
64 acres of freehold land owned by an Indo-Fijian 
family. Over decades, 381 squatters had infor-
mally settled on their land, which the owners (who 
reside overseas) now wish to subdivide into indus-
trial estates. The Department of Housing success-
fully negotiated with the TLTB to access 31 acres 
of available customary land for the relocation of 
these families. In addition, it was agreed that the 
Indo-Fijian owners would contribute to the reloca-
tion, providing $1000 compensation per family. A 
further request, still in negotiation, is that the land-
owners also concede a portion of their property; in 
this case 10 of the 64 acres, which will be used to 
house some of the squatters.
While better than eviction, there were some 
concerns raised about whether the families will be 
disconnected from their sources of income and 
subsistence as well as their social networks once 
relocated, and that the sheer numbers involved 
make it unlikely all families will be adequately 
resettled (Bryant-Tokalau 2012). There is also the 
potential for rent-seeking if families sell their new 
lots and resettle in other informal settlements. Yet 
another concern is that this approach sets in place 
an incentive to squat. While these are all legiti-
mate concerns, it appears the government feels the 
potential perverse incentives are outweighed by the 
benefits of developing the urban land and avoid-
ing evictions and legal wrangles. This social tangle 
of rights and relationships to urban land opens 
a small window on the complexity of applying a 
rights-based approach to urban development; it is 
very unclear whose rights should be the basis of 
urban development frameworks. The solution may 
only be found through context-specific and flexible 
social negotiations that bridge neoliberal and neo-
communitarian governance values.
Finding Shelter and Meeting the Bills 
Access to shelter and housing is a cornerstone of 
livable cities and thus an indicator of sustainable 
development, as noted above. While accessing hous-
ing is related to land availability and affordability, 
the two are not the same — as evident in rental 
properties and housing upgrades. In terms of hous-
ing governance in Fiji, this sector is managed by 
the Department of Housing, which sits within the 
Ministry of Local Government, Housing, Environ-
ment, Infrastructure & Transport. One challenge in 
Fiji’s governance of housing has been to develop a 
legal and institutional framework that can efficiently 
meet the demand for housing by a rapidly grow-
ing urban population. Prior to the National Hous-
ing Policy of 2011, urban housing development was 
regulated by over 25 different Acts covering finance, 
lands, environmental planning, infrastructure, ser-
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vices and construction; a conglomeration that often 
confused matters and delayed approvals.8 In infor-
mal sectors, full compliance is rare.
One of the major recommendations in the 2011 
Housing policy was to try to bring the administra-
tion of the informal settlements, emergency hous-
ing and private housing under the one framework, 
and thus reduce overlapping approval processes, 
remove delays, and enable faster housing and 
land development with higher levels of compli-
ance. Although this policy has brought about some 
positive integration, budgetary constraints have 
restricted the implementation of some of the rec-
ommendations and an overarching legal framework 
is still in progress. Moreover, a senior official in the 
Department of Housing expressed concern that his 
office is charged with the responsibility of rolling 
out programs and regulating settlements, without the 
sufficient authority to do so effectively: ’We are enforc-
ing the programs but don’t have the legal power … 
we’re having to be reactionary rather than proactive’.9
The People’s Community Network (PCN), a 
national advocate for informal settlers and the poor 
in Fiji, has coordinated government agencies and 
Catholic aid to build Lagilagi, a high-rise, low-cost 
housing estate that is being built in several phases 
to gradually rehouse residents of Jittu Estate squat-
ter settlement. The PCN has a system in which 
long-term informal settlers of Jittu undergo social 
and economic empowerment workshops and are 
encouraged to save over time, after which they can 
access a strata title to one of the houses to be paid 
off at a reduced rate over 12 years. Residents can 
also contribute ‘sweat equity’ toward the cost of the 
shelter — reducing the financial burden and tap-
ping into considerable human resources within 
the community while building skills. Like many 
projects, this venture has faced rumours about 
nepotism and bias in allocation (Rika 2016). Since 
nepotism relates to the favourable treatment of rela-
tives expected within social structures of reciprocity 
and obligation, tackling this issue, and the need for 
greater accountability, may be seen as a challenge 
of neo-communitarian urban governance. Never-
theless, over 70 households have successfully been 
relocated with a further 70 to follow.
Another key player in the housing sector is the 
Housing Authority of Fiji (FHA), which is a com-
mercial statutory authority that began by provid-
ing affordable accommodation for those unable to 
secure a home, but has since expanded its reach to 
include mortgage financing for middle- to high-
income earners. The interest rates of an FHA loan, 
after the first 12 months, are comparable to a bank 
loan. However, the requirements are more flex-
ible with the authority than with the banks, and 
the authority will not assist high-income earn-
ers, whereas the banks — obviously — will. The 
required deposit amount is also less (10 per cent 
versus 20 per cent) and may be drawn from the Fiji 
National Provident Fund.
According to the FHA website, the general 
requirements to obtain a loan through the author-
ity are Fijian citizenship, proof of employment, 
Jittu Estate residents — [Left]: six people live in this one-bedroom, corrugated-iron semi-permanent 
house. They are scheduled to move to Lagilagi house once phase two is built;  
[Right]: Fully serviced Lagilagi houses.
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to be aged at least 21 years and to earn less than 
FJ$50,000 per year (increased if it is a joint appli-
cation). The FHA offers refinancing (bringing an 
existing home loan under their scheme) or new 
mortgages. It contributes to the goal of the Fiji 
Housing Policy aimed at ‘affordable and decent 
housing for all communities by 2020’, launched in 
2011. The home loan rehabilitation policy imple-
mented as part of this strategy was aimed at helping 
people struggling to repay their mortgages which 
includes those who have paid more than the prin-
cipal amount, customers who are unemployed, and 
any customers facing financial difficulty. Prime 
Minister Bainimarama said at its launch:
This is a social policy and is in line with 
the government’s commitment to ensuring 
the Housing Authority plays a key role in 
empowering our people and promoting home 
ownership. This policy is not a hand-out but 
is a social desire to assist the marginalised 
and those most at risk of losing their homes. 
(Fiji Government 22/1/2011).
Here we see a dual discourse which, at one level, is 
a communitarian leg-up for the disadvantaged and, 
at another, a market-friendly supplement to pro-
mote ongoing participation in the neoliberal econ-
omy. Yet the existence of the housing authority is 
in contrast to other Melanesian countries; like the 
Solomon Islands who do not have such an entity 
to provide housing finance for home buyers, and is 
instead reliant on banks, Solomon Islands NPF or 
private lenders — all of which can be costly, put-
ting home ownership out of reach of the majority 
(Samuel 2016).
Recognising that not all in Fiji can buy homes, 
Fiji has also established a Public Rental Board. 
On recommendation by the World Bank, the 
Public Rental Board is separate from the housing 
authority and managed by a separate Board of 
Directors, although there is continuity with the 
same chair sitting on both. The Public Rental 
Board acts as a commercial statutory authority that 
seeks to monitor rental flats for underprivileged 
tenants, and provides government subsidies 
when a disproportionate percentage of a tenant’s 
salary is allocated to rent. It currently manages 
20 rental estates with approximately 1550 rental 
flats. However, the agency self-reports that it 
struggles to keep up with the demand for affordable 
housing (Public Rental Board 2016) and there 
is an extremely long waiting list.10 The current 
calculation for subsidies is listed in Table 2.
Officially, all can access this assistance: rents 
are subsidised for those who can prove their low 
income (or no income) by producing their pay 
slips or a recommendation from the Social Wel-
fare Department. However, simultaneously, there 
is strong sociopolitical concern that undeserving 
people are being granted assistance in a number of 
these programs, giving rise to a push for better sur-
veillance over applicants for assistance. A cabinet 
submission is currently being debated that increas-
es the threshold of proof of eligibility. As a senior 
Weekly Gross Income  
(WGI) Range ($)
Criterion 
(% of Income)
Tenant Contribution 
(% of WGI)
1 0–80 5 5
2 81–100 8 8
3 101–125 11 11
4 126–150 14 14
5 151–175 17 17
6 176–200 20 20
Table 2. Public Rental Board Subsidy Criterion, 2010
Source: Public Rental Board. 
Note: All PRB properties undergo a property valuation to determine market rent charges. The 2010 subsidy  
is applicable to the estates where general renovation has taken place and rent has been reviewed.  
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official in the Ministry of Lands stated: ‘We have 
to ensure only the genuine qualify. We conduct a 
socioeconomic survey and they must provide proof. 
Then we conduct a search of all landowners’ other 
holdings. They can’t hide from us’.11
However, for those who are very poor or earn-
ing a living in the informal sectors, income can be 
largely undocumented and irregular; thus making 
access to this system almost impossible. Most street 
vendors, for example, live in informal settlements 
rather than formal public rentals.12 Thus, while 
these policies go some way to increasing accessibili-
ty to shelter and finance, and thus improving urban 
equity, there are those who remain marginalised.
Servicing the City: Connecting Places and 
People
The provision of services to settlements such as 
water and waste collection is a challenge faced by 
all Pacific islands countries, due to both geographic 
and technical barriers. In some, service-providers 
require legal land tenure before they provide access 
to urban services. However, the water authority of 
Fiji has established an arrangement whereby they 
accept government-issued identification creden-
tials and will provide ‘temporary water connec-
tions’ if the tenants have formal permission from 
the Department of Housing and/or the landown-
ers — creating a subtle recognition of the dual for-
mal/customary tenure systems in operation. Fiji is 
recognised as a ‘clear leader’ in providing piped, 
treated water services for urban households, includ-
ing in customary and informal settlements (World 
Bank 2015); 94 per cent of Fiji’s urban population 
has access to clean water (ADB 2014b). Though, in 
some cases, residents may have a connection but 
only intermittent, and sometimes unhygienic, sup-
ply (UN-Habitat 2012a).
Water theft is still a problem in many informal 
settlements and water agencies throughout Melane-
sia, resulting in large losses of revenue and water. In 
Fiji, though, the water authority has sought to place 
customer meters at the edge of a settlement rather 
than at each household, and the community must 
then install distribution piping to each household 
and collect fees; an acknowledgement that leverag-
ing social capital may work better than centralised 
regulation and individual pricing mechanisms. This 
approach places more responsibility on the house-
hold and community to monitor water theft (World 
Bank 2015). A challenge for many poor settlements, 
however, is that they are expected to pay for, and 
establish, their own pipes.13 This has the poten-
tial for unequal service access, and poor plumbing 
which may lead to contamination.
Waste management has been an ongoing prob-
lem in Suva, as well as all other Melanesian cities. 
However, in Suva collection and management has 
markedly improved over time and it leads Mela-
nesian cities in service delivery. Suva City Council 
has significantly increased the budget for waste col-
lection and contracted out the services for organic 
waste. Due to issues with contractor non-compli-
ance or inefficacy in the past, the council has strin-
gent, binding contract conditions and the waste 
collection contractors are monitored closely. Gar-
bage collection now happens efficiently three times 
a week, which is facilitated by Suva City Council’s 
substantial rate base.
The media often echoes the voice of local 
‘rate payers’ who are concerned about the ‘eye-
sore’ of informal settlements and particularly the 
perceived ‘indiscriminate dumping of rubbish’, 
which is deemed to cause environmental dam-
age and reduce surrounding property values (e.g. 
Fiji Sun 3/12/2008). However, there are a number 
of structural constraints that contribute to waste 
problems in these settings — informal settlements 
have fewer roads and infrastructure making waste 
collection harder than in other areas of the city — 
Skip bin for waste outside Jittu Estate squatter 
settlement.
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a situation that could be exacerbated by lowering 
infrastructure standards to reduce social and com-
munity costs of upgrading (see earlier remarks). In 
response to mounting waste complaints but limited 
roading, the Suva City Council has installed skip 
bins at the edge of squatter settlements, which is a 
strategy to allow settlement residents to dispose of 
waste at any time and for the community to take 
greater responsibility. 
Conclusion: Policy Implications
The quest for sustainable urban development is 
ongoing in the GSUA, but there have been some 
notable keys to policy success. While sometimes at 
odds, communitarian and neoliberal approaches 
to urban growth need not be binary. Policy-mak-
ers have necessarily straddled the two systems of 
governance, arriving at policy solutions which — 
though not perfect — are making some headway in 
better facilitating the inexorable march of urbanisa-
tion in a uniquely Fijian sociocultural context. The 
mix of land tenure types — state, customary and 
private — will persist, as will tenure arrangements 
like vakavanua which are rooted in custom and 
spread the benefits of urban land access more wide-
ly. To boost urban equity and justice, these arrange-
ments need to be nested in legal systems that can 
enforce the rights of landowners and tenants when 
disputes arise. Ideally, this will involve an arrange-
ment which draws on both neoliberal and commu-
nitarian values now entwined in the Melanesian city.
Although the GSUA has no single mechanism 
for coordinating services to manage urban growth, 
it has a good level of multi-sectorial and multi-
layered cooperation, which has led to a number of 
successful initiatives that go some way to address-
ing the shortage of affordable housing and services. 
The rural resettlement program and the regulari-
sation of land tenure have involved collaboration 
between the TLTB, Public Rental Board, Housing 
Authority, Ministry of Lands and Department of 
Housing, Town and Country Planning, munici-
pal councils and NGOs. Regularising land tenure 
has been a particularly crucial aspect of Suva’s 
experience. As demonstrated in the case of Bang-
ladesh squatter settlement, being granted tenure 
can give people a stronger sense of security as well 
as increase their sense of civic pride. When done 
across a community it can also build social capital.
In terms of challenges ahead, Suva authorities 
still struggle to fully support different land tenure 
types and to spread access to customary land more 
equitably across landowners. Building well-ser-
viced, low-cost housing fast enough to cater for the 
rapidly expanding urban population also remains 
a challenge. In the words of the Director of Hous-
ing, there are five pressures on the housing sector: 
1) security of tenure, 2) sanitation, 3) overcrowd-
ing, 4) water and 5) decent housing. If any one of 
these is not adequately addressed, the squatting 
problem will potentially grow. Moreover, successful 
management and recognition of the informal sector 
remains crucial to ensuring the equitable distribu-
tion of benefits and effective roll out of assistance 
policies to those in most need. But, there are the 
very vexed issues of who has rights in the city and 
how trade-offs between those claiming rights are 
resolved. Suva at least is trialling the facilitation 
of mediated solutions for land claims, involving a 
range of stakeholders.
Given the cultural context, it is likely that sus-
tainable urban development will be a blend of neo-
liberal and neo-communitarian approaches, but 
getting the mix right is a real challenge. There is 
a palpable, progressive momentum with regards 
to urban governance in Suva at the moment, but 
ongoing political commitment and genuine finan-
cial backing must be sustained to maintain and 
progress successes to date, and to reach an equita-
ble sharing of the city.
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